Sunday, February 15, 2015

A 3D Printable Model of Cloud Gate aka "The Bean"

There are few works of modern art as beloved as Chicago's Cloud Gate, aka "The Bean".  It is interactive without having any moving parts, and indeed without being mobile at all.  Nobody at any age can resist engaging with their reflection in its curiously curved surface.

I started playing with TinkerCad because I wanted to use the 3D printer at work, a Makerbot Replicator, to print custom enclosures for my other electronics projects.  I thought that printing a model of Cloud Gate would be an easy way to learn to use the system before building my enclosures.  It turns out that I had it completely backwards.  To print an enclosure out of basic shapes (cylinders and boxes) is many times easier than designing your own custom surface for printing, and it took me a very long time to finally get it right.

I learned a few things about Cloud Gate as I worked on this model:
  • Cloud Gate as seen from above is not a perfect ellipse.
  • Wikipedia and all other sources including Anish Kappor's own website as the dimensions of Cloud Gate wrong.  In particular, the height of the arch.  You only need to stand under the arch to see that there is no way that it is 12 feet high.  At most, it might be 10.
  • It is not possible to continuously deform a sphere into Cloud Gate.  Its derivatives are discontinuous at certain points on the surface, so I had to resort to Bezier curves to model it.

I am 6' 1" tall.  There is no way that the arch is 12 feet tall.  If I put my hand straight up, I can come within a foot of touching the arch.
Once I finally got the right form for the equations that generate the model, it was simply a matter of tuning the constants that generate the surface to match Cloud Gate as closely as possible.  I'm confident that my current version of the model is close enough that, while certainly not an exact copy, nobody would be able to tell the difference even if I scaled mine to the size of the real thing and put them side-by-side.

The evolution of the model.  The earliest model was printed in 2 separate pieces connected with pegs before I realized that the model prints fine when it is printed upside-down with supports and a raft.
The underside of the models.  I think that they look better printed at standard resolution because the natural color PVA comes out shinier.

The model is well-balanced enough that it does not require a stand to sit normally.

End-on, Cloud Gate has an egg-like shape.
The underside of the model showing the omphalos, or navel.
I recommend printing the model upside-down using supports and rafts, 25% infill and standard quality.  The supports are straightforward to remove using a razor blade.  The higher infill is necessary because the flat surfaces have a tendency to sag a bit at lower infill, and the standard quality prints with a larger radius and gives a shinier result.

It's also pretty fun to take my shape generator on TinkerCad and play with your own variant of Cloud Gate by editing the parameters.  If I feel bold later, I may try having one 3D printed in steel then buffing it to a mirror finish for the ultimate desktop Cloud Gate.

Download the model or printable STL files here:

Thursday, January 29, 2015

Bayesian Network Reconstruction Using Systems Genetics Data: Comparison of MCMC Methods

Several former colleagues and I collaborated on a paper that was finally published in Genetics on January 28.  You can read it for free online here.

I won't regurgitate the entire work here, but I did want to take a moment to say why this research is important for many fields, not just genetics.  In fact, the Bayesian network reconstruction problem arises in numerous places including finance, machine learning, and crystallography.  The premise of it is this:  suppose you had a black box that, based on some inputs that are supplied to it, would perform a possibly random calculation and then give some results back to you.  Now it is your job to figure out how the machine works.  How are the outputs related to the inputs, and more importantly what is the underlying calculation that happens to produce these outputs?  Keep in mind that this machine could be doing nearly anything under the hood:  performing entirely different calculations based on one input, rolling dice and giving a random result, or throwing your inputs out entirely.

To computational biologists right now, the cell is such a black box.  We are able to measure a lot of things about it and do a lot of things to it, but we are unable to actually look at all of the things that are happening inside a cell in real time.  Not only are they happening at really fast timescales, we don't have microscopes capable of watching all of the relevant interactions that happen inside a cell at once, for example DNA unwinding, RNA synthesis, ribosomes making proteins, protein folding, protein-protein and extra-cellular interactions.  As a result, we are left measuring things such as single-nucleotide polymorphism and expression data and then trying to infer how the genes in the cell worked after the fact.

How we reconstruct a cell's regulatory network is remarkably naive:   we construct a completely random network, tweak it to make it more plausible (e.g., simulated annealing or gradient descent), and then repeat this many many times.  Finally, we propose that the links in the resulting networks that appeared most often are likely to be the true connections in the real network.

This isn't a perfect approach, but it has yielded new insights in the past.  Perhaps someday someone will come up with a greatly improved approach to reconstructing Bayesian networks, and it will be a boon to technology and mankind worthy of a Nobel prize.

Saturday, January 10, 2015

Nash Equilibrium in the Sealed-Bid Senior Auction

At work we've been thinking a lot about auction theory, and I was challenged to solve for the Nash equilibrium in the sealed-bid senior auction.  I found the solution and I think the result is pretty interesting, but before I get to that point I want to give some background about what an auction is and this scenario in particular.

An sealed-bid auction is in its purest sense a game played between a number of bidders who all would like an item and would like to pay as little as possible for it to maximize their profit.  Unlike an auction like eBay where the current hammer price is public knowledge, in the sealed-bid auction every bidder will write down how much they want to bid for the item.  The auctioneer will then collect all of these secret bids and select the highest bid to be the winner1.  Nobody has a chance to change their bid after they pass the auctioneer their secret bid.

It's crucial to understand what a Nash Equilibrium is, and why it's important.  Simply put, a Nash equilibrium strategy is a strategy such that if it was known that all other bidders were following this strategy, then it would not be optimal to deviate from the strategy.  A kind of Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategy, where all bidders should follow the dominant strategy regardless of what the other players were doing.

Let's start with a familiar example of a dominant strategy:  the second-price auction.  In a second-price auction, the highest bidder wins but only pays as much as the second-highest bidder.  An example of this is an eBay auction.  In a second-price auction, the dominant strategy is to bid your valuation v of the item at auction.  In the case where you lose the auction, you pay nothing and gain nothing.  In the case where you win the auction, you get the item (with value v) and you pay the second-highest bidder's bid (which we will call b for now).  Your profit is then v - b, and is maximized because if you had bid less than b then you wouldn't have won the auction, if you bid between b and v then you are indifferent because you would have paid b and made profit v - b anyway, and if you had bid more than v you might have actually lost money because you would have paid more than the item is worth to you if the second bidder had bid higher than v.  Thus, no matter what, even if you knew that everyone else was going to bid zero, you would still bid your valuation of the item in the second-price auction.

The first-price sealed-bid auction, on the other hand, does not have a dominant strategy.  In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the highest bid wins the item and pays their bid exactly.  In this case, bidding my valuation v is actually not a good idea:  I will never make a profit!  If I lose, I get nothing, and if I win, my profit is my valuation v minus my bid v, which is zero!

In fact, in the first-price sealed-bid auction, the best strategy actually depends on the distribution of valuations of the item in question.  That is, if I thought everyone valued the item between $0 and $1 with a uniform distribution, then the optimal strategy would be different than if everyone valued the item in a normal distribution around $0.50.  It becomes even more complicated in the case where I am uncertain in my appraisal of the item, in which case I must consider the winner's curse!

I will sidestep all of this complexity by asserting that in every case I study below, the bidders all know that every bidder's valuation of the item is selected from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and that every bidder knows how many other bidders there are.  The solutions below are only applicable given this assertion.

In the first-price sealed-bid auction, the ideal bid would be only slightly higher than the second place bidder's bid.  Naively, I will make the zero-order guess that all bidders will actually bid their valuation except for the one who actually does the math.  Now I'd like to know the bid that maximizes this privileged bidder's profit, which is the maximum of the expectation value of profit given a particular bid b, valuation v and number of bidders N.  So,

Equation 1:  Expected profit in the uniform-distribution first-price sealed-bid auction assuming that all bidders except one privileged bidder bid their value.

The first term is the profit if the privileged bidder wins with bid b, and the second term is the probability that all other bidders had valuations and bids less than b.  The expected profit is maximized if the first derivative is zero2

Equation 2:  Solving for the the maximum expected profit in the uniform-distribution first-price sealed-bid auction, if all bidders but one bid their valuation

It is now straightforward to solve for the optimal bidding strategy.

Equation 3:  I will show that this is the Nash equilibrium strategy in the uniform-distribution first-price sealed-bid auction.

I made a crucial assumption above:  that every other player would bid their valuation.  A strategy is only a Nash equilibrium if the strategy would be optimal given that everyone else is using the strategy.  If everyone were using this bidding strategy, would it be worthwhile to deviate?  To find out, I can substitute this bidding strategy into the profit term in equation 1 and solve again.  Now, all of the other bidders are using the strategy in Equation 3.  Can our privileged bidder do better?  The first term in Equation 1 remains the same:  the profit will just be his value minus his bid.  However, the probability that a bidder wins with this bid has changed because everyone else's value could actually be somewhat higher, v = N b / (N - 1).

Equation 4:  Solving for the maximum profit in the uniform-distribution first-price sealed-bid auction, if all other players bid the Nash equilibrium.

Just like in equation 2, I can solve for the new optimal strategy.  It should be obvious that the optimal bid, which is just the solution to

is just the same as equation 3.  Therefore, equation 3 is the Nash equilibrium.

I can now calculate the winner's expected profit in equilibrium by substituting equation 3 into equation 4, yielding

Equation 5:  The expected profit given that all players bid rationally in the uniform-distribution first-price sealed-bid auction.

It turns out that equation 5 is something more universal than might be expected.  The Revenue Equivalence Theorem tells us that as long as we set the rules of the auction so that the highest bidder wins the item and a bidder with value 0 has an expected profit of 0, all sealed-bid uniform-distribution auctions will have the same expected profit as in equation 5!

For example, let's consider an all-pay auction.  In an all-pay auction, every bidder pays their bid but only the highest bidder goes home with the item.  Obviously, a bidder should bid less than in the first-price auction above because their risk is higher: a bidder will always pay his bid but may not actually get the item to show for it.  As long as a bidder's valuation is more than zero, then he should bid more than zero because there is a small chance that he could get a spectacular deal on the item!  How much, exactly, should a bidder bid?

I'll solve this with the revenue equivalence theorem.  The revenue equivalence theorem tells me that the expected profit must be the same as in Equation 5, because the highest bidder still wins the auction and a bidder with the lowest valuation, 0, will simply walk away from the auction neither profiting nor paying.  Therefore, equation to solve is:

The left hand side of the equation comes from the revenue equivalence theorem.  The right hand side is justified as follows:  if a bidder has the highest valuation v (and therefore the highest bid), then he gets the item and recovers value v.  All bidders always pay their bid, b, in the all-pay auction so that value is simply subtracted.   This is trivially solved:

Equation 6:  The Nash equilibrium bid in the uniform-distribution all-pay sealed-bid auction.

Now I am ready to tackle the original challenge:  the Senior Auction.  In the Senior Auction, the first-place and second-place bidders both pay, but nobody else does.  Like all other auctions discussed here, the highest bidder will still be the one who takes home the item.  A rational bidder should bid at least as much in the all-pay auction because their risk is lower, and should bid less than in the first-price auction because their risk is higher.  Let's find out exactly how much using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.

This should be fairly straightforward to solve.  The profit for the highest bidder is v - b, and the cost for the second-highest bidder is their bid b.  Thus, I have:

Which is just

This is straightforward to solve for b in terms of v:
Equation 7:  The Nash equilibrium bid in the uniform-distribution sealed-bid senior auction.

For example, let's take a look at the Nash equilibrium bid in the first-price, all-pay and senior auction for 10 bidders.

Figure 1:  Nash equilibrium bid as a function of valuation in three different types of auction, given 10 bidders with uniform valuations on [0,1]. 

Figure 1 shows two things that give us confidence in the result from equation 7.  A rational bidder always bids at least as high in the senior auction as in the all pay auction, and never bids more than in the first price auction.  This makes sense because the bidder's risk in the senior auction is higher than in the first price auction, but lower than that in all pay.  Another comforting observation in equation 7 is that for N = 2, the result is exactly the same as in the all pay auction as would be expected.

I'd like to verify that this is actually a Nash equilibrium by inverting equation 7, substituting back into the expected profit function and taking the first derivative, but that is algebraically cumbersome.  Instead, I will employ a computer algebra system, wxMaxima, and verify that the solution is a Nash equilibrium for some chosen values.  In my Maxima notebook (download here), I require both bid(v, B), which is the putative equilibrium bid given valuation v and number of bidders B and value(b, B), which inverts bid(v, B) with respect to valuation. The function ExpectedWinnings(b, v, N, B) gives the expected winnings in a top-N-pay auction given bid b, valuation v, N the number of top bidders who pay their bid, and the number of bidders B.  The 
expression solve(diff(ExpectedWinningsAllPay(b, v, B), b), b) determines the optimal bid b by solving 

given that all other bidders engage in the strategy prescribed by bid and value.  If the result is the same as bid, then bid is a Nash equilibrium because there is nothing to be gained from deviating from this strategy given that everyone else is using it.

If you execute my wxMaxima notebook yourself, you will see that Equation 7 is indeed a Nash equilibrium for the chosen valuation and number of bidders, so it is empirically true that Equation 7 is the Nash equilibrium for the uniform-distribution sealed-bid senior auction.

1 Not all kinds of sealed-bid auctions give the item to the highest bidder, and not all kinds of sealed-bid auctions require that each bidder places only one bid.  For all examples here, the highest bidder wins.  Interested parties might read about unique bid auctions.

2 Actually, it may be maximized or minimized. A more thorough person would check the second derivative to determine whether he found a local maximum or a local minimum. This is an exercise left to the reader.

Tuesday, November 11, 2014

Wedding Photos

Josh, our wedding photographer, recently sent us our wedding photos and we're really excited about them.  I looked at roughly a hundred photographers when we were planning our wedding as I like to think I have high standards for photography, and I separated them into four groups:  "People who picked up a camera and decided that they too make money at weddings," "People with a decent understanding of photography but who don't know how to shoot weddings," "People who understand photography and who know what shots people want taken at weddings," and "Artists."  Of about 100 photographers, there were three that I considered artists--people who understand photography, understand weddings, and who have an eye for a shot that looks natural and beautiful.  One of them was booked for our weekend a year in advance, and of the other two Simiao preferred Josh.  If you are looking for a wedding photographer, I couldn't recommend him more highly.  He was even willing to work with us to create a package that was exactly what we needed, and I think the quality of his work speaks for itself.  I've posted some favorite shots here, and if you want to see the rest of them you can look at the watermarked photos in my Google drive.  Please feel free to share or repost the watermarked photos.  If you want an un-watermarked photo suitable for printing, let me know and I will grant you access to the printable photos.

This was actually the first moment I saw Simiao in her wedding dress.

Our extremely silly wedding party.

The big moment--we were both doing our best to keep it together.

Cocktail hour in the Founder's room.

The festivities went on until midnight.

Please feel free to download, share, and enjoy the entire collection.  If you'd like a printable, un-watermarked original of one, let me know and I will give you access to those.

Monday, October 13, 2014

I Am Now Married

I apologize for the radio silence over the last several months!  I have been working on a few projects that have been more time consuming than originally expected, but when they're ready I promise that it'll be worth the wait.

First, in May I moved to Chicago to be with Simiao, who matched to Northwestern for Emergency Medicine.  As I prepared to move, I realized that most of the stuff I owned was worn out, so I threw out nearly everything that I couldn't mail or fit in my car and left Seattle on the very path that I drove in on two and a half years earlier.  I also necessarily changed teams at Google because, naturally, I also had to change offices.

Moving into a new city and a new apartment with no stuff presents a new issue.  It took us nearly a month to assemble the trappings of a normal life.  A bed, a couch, a dinner table, a television.  These aren't things you think a lot about until you realize that you don't own one, and so when we could finally come home, relax, and actually feel like we were at home it felt like an achievement.  It was an achievement that we didn't have much time to savor because following the move we were now far behind schedule on planning our wedding.  Thinking about it now, it's actually kind of amazing (and a credit to Simiao's awesome family who helped us along the way) that it all came together as well as it did.

Our wedding on Saturday was wonderful.  It was small, personal, and the Morton Arboretum is a beautiful venue.  It meant a lot to us that we could have a place that felt private and natural, and that didn't give any acknowledgement to a religion which neither of us subscribe to.  It was everything that I ever wanted in a wedding and I can't wait to share the photos with you when they're ready.

For now, I have two treats for you.  First, our vows.  Simiao's were so sweet that I can still barely read them without tearing up.  In fact, it seemed like everyone present could barely hold it together.

I vow to pursue patience, compromise, and reciprocity every day.
I vow to take pride in who we are, individually and together.
I vow to support you in times of trouble.
I vow to honor and respect you for all that you are and will become.
Above all, I vow to give you my love freely and unconditionally, for all the days of our lives.

I vow to treat you with honor, love and dignity.
I vow to use life's challenges to edify our relationship.
I vow to protect you with all of my strength.
I vow to inspire your trust.
Likewise, I vow to give you my love freely and unconditionally, for all the days of our lives.

Second, we got our engagement photos!  I've placed a few favorites here, and the rest of the watermarked ones can be found publicly in my Google drive here (feel free to share these on social media if you like).  If you'd like access to the printable ones to print a photo for your personal use (you may not share them on social media), please request access here.

Monday, April 7, 2014

Time Again

A Shaggy Mouse Nudibranch found in
tide pools at Discovery Park in Seattle.
We recently picked up two more pinhole cameras that had been sitting around Seattle all winter long.  One spent about 9 months on the roof of an apartment building in Wallingford, and another spent about 3 months behind a sealed-up military housing unit at Discovery Park.  Both pieces of photo paper came out remarkably wet and sticky, but with intact photos. It was interesting that these cameras which used a much smaller aperture than the previous ones were burned red with the exposure instead of the violet or black of the previous cameras, and it's unclear whether this is due to the lower level of exposure to the sun or the extreme dampness of the photo paper due to the elements.  Curiously, these negatives also required much less correction using color curves than previous exposures.  One lesson that has proved useful in selecting sites for the pinhole cameras is that the subject should be as strongly backlit as possible.  In the case of the abandoned military housing, we selected a site where the pinhole camera would frequently fall directly in the shadow of the subject, which made for a beautiful shot.

Pinhole exposure lasting roughly 9 months on the roof of an apartment building in Wallingford.  Exposed July 2013-April 2014.
Pinhole exposure from Jan 25, 2014 until April 5, 2014.  Boarded-up military housing at Discovery Park.

Saturday, April 5, 2014


What's left of the old Hanford high school.
Ever since I moved to Seattle, I had always wanted to go tour the Hanford Nuclear Reservation.  Even as the military used the Hanford site to transmute Uranium into Plutonium, they transmuted a gorgeous desert landscape into a terribly contaminated mess.  It's hard to imagine anyone having such disrespect for the landscape today, but back then contaminated water was actually piped directly into the Columbia river and sometimes outright dumped into the desert.  Waste that would be toxic for 10,000 years was pumped into tanks designed to last 50.  The American and Washington state taxpayer is paying the price for this cleanup today, but the tour guides will tell you that it is likely that parts of the reservation may have to be controlled and monitored for the foreseeable future.  That said, the B reactor is a marvel of engineering that is very much worth your time to come out and see and perhaps the best historical site tour I've been on since the Titan Missile Museum.  You can make reservations online at their website,

These cylinders were loaded with Uranium slugs while the reactor was in operation.  Every month, the reactor was shut down and the slugs were removed and sent for processing at a nearby facility where Plutonium could be extracted.  The B reactor did not produce any electricity, only plutonium.  The waste hot water was piped to cooling ponds and ultimately back to the river.

The B reactor staff was well prepared for the event of a radioactive zombie attack.

Systems in the reactor were either remarkably high-tech or remarkably low-tech.  In the case that power to the horizontal control rods was lost, giant buckets of stones would be dropped onto a cylinder of hydraulic fluid, pushing the control rods into the safe shut-down position.
A final backup plan was stored in the control room office space.  No, the backup plan was not keys to a rocket car or the phone number to the President.  It was the one thing they were sure to need in case of a meltdown.
"SCRAM" is a term originating from the early days of nuclear reactors, when the safety back-up plan was "Single Control Rod Axe Man."  In these early reactors, a single control rod was positioned above the reactor suspended by a rope.  In the event that the reactor went out of control, Single Control Rod Axe Man would cut the rope and drop the control rod into the reactor and stop the reactor.  In the B reactor, there were vertical control rods suspended above the reactor that could be dropped into place in case the horizontal control rods be rendered inoperable and for historical reasons this was known as SCRAMming the reactor.  So, yeah: Simiao and Theo should just go ahead and mash those buttons.